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Abstract—Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in
wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a
realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary
users often specify the usage of a fixed spectrum frequency
band in a certain geographical region and require a duration
time in a fixed available time interval. Considering the selfish
behaviors of secondary users, it is imperative to design a truthful
auction which matches the available spectrums and requests of
secondary users optimally. Unfortunately, existing designs either
do not consider spectrum heterogeneity or ignore the differences
of required time among secondary users.
In this paper, we address this problem by investigating how to
use auction mechanisms to allocate and price spectrum resources
so that the social efficiency can be maximized. We begin by
classifying the spectrums and requests from secondary users into
different local markets which ensures there is no interference
between local markets, and then we can focus on the auction in
a single local market. We first design an optimal auction based
on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to maximize
the social efficiency while enforcing truthfulness. To reduce the
computational complexity, we further propose a truthful sub-
optimal auction with polynomial time complexity, which yields
an approximation factor 6 + 4
√
2. Our extensive simulation
results using real spectrum availability data show that the social
efficiency ratio of the sub-optimal auction is always above 70%
compared with the optimal auction.
Index Terms—spectrum auction, heterogeneous spectrum allo-
cation, truthful
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing popularity of wireless devices and
applications, the ever-increasing demand of traffic poses a
great challenge in spectrum allocation and usage. However,
current fixed long-term and regional lease spectrum alloca-
tion scheme leads to significant spectrum white spaces and
artificial shortage of spectrum resources. Many efforts such
as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruling on
white spaces are attempting to free the under-utilized licensed
spectrum by permitting opportunistic access [12]. However,
the incumbents have no incentive to permit their spectrum to
be shared [14]. In order to utilize such idle spectrum resources,
one promising technology is to encourage secondary users
sublease spectrum from primary users (who own the right to
use spectrum exclusively) [27].
Auction serves as such an effective way that helps increase
the efficiency and effectiveness of the spectrum, in which
the primary user could gain utilities by leasing their idle
spectrums in economic perspective while new applicants could
gain access to these spectrums [10], [13]. Previous studies
on spectrum auctions (e.g. [9], [28], [29]) mainly consider
wireless interference and spatial reuse of channels under
economic robustness constraints. Most of the existing works
assume that secondary users can share one channel only
if they are spatial-conflict free with each other. However,
under a more realistic model, a secondary user may only be
interested in the usage of one channel during some specific
time periods. Therefore, secondary users can share the same
channel in spatial, temporal, and spectral domain without
causing interference with each other. So, it is reasonable to
further improve the spectrum utilization by introducing time-
domain.
Following in this direction, some papers [21], [27], [25] and
[4] take the requested time durations of secondary users into
consideration. However, all these works only consider a special
case where all the secondary users request some fixed continu-
ous time intervals. In fact, the request time of a secondary user
is not always fixed. For example, some people may request the
usage of one channel for 2 hours in an available time interval
which last from 2:00PM to 5:00PM, instead of requesting a
fixed time interval lasts from 2:00PM to 4:00PM. Therefore,
the case of a secondary user requests a duration time for the
usage of one channel in some available time windows is more
general than the study of previous works. On the other side,
spectrum provided by the primary users is often heterogeneous
in a realistic spectrum market. For instance, spectrums may
reside in various frequency bands, and the communication
quality changes greatly when frequency band varies (frequency
heterogeneity) [6]. Meanwhile, spectrum is a local resource
and is available only within the license region (market locality)
[22]. Spectrum heterogeneity is investigated in [6], [14], [18].
Nevertheless, none of the existing works has addressed the
spectrum heterogeneity and secondary users’ time demand at
the same time.
In this paper, we propose a framework in which secondary
users can request the usage of one channel with specific
frequency band type in a specific area and during some specific
time periods. The time slots allocated to a fixed request should
be supplied by one channel, and may be discretely distributed
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natural goal of spectrum auction is to maximize the social
efficiency, i.e., allocating spectrum to the secondary users
who value it most. Therefore, our aim in this work is to
design auction mechanisms which maximize social efficiency
while ensuring truthful bidding from secondary users. This
model is similar to the weighted time scheduling problem for
the multi-machine version [3]. However, the studies on time
scheduling problems are not concerned with the truthfulness of
jobs, which is one of the most critical properties in spectrum
auction. Furthermore, in [3] a fixed job can be allocated into
different machines in time scheduling problem. In our model, a
fixed request can only be allocated in one channel. Therefore,
the studies on time schedule problem cannot be directly used in
auctions for spectrum allocation. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to design truthful auction mechanisms for
spectrum allocation in this model.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. This
paper studies the case where each request of secondary user
contains a specific area and an interested type of spectrum.
Moreover, channels supplied by the primary user also include
sub-region and spectrum type information. We divide the
spectrum market into several non-interference local markets
according to the area and spectrum type. Our new schemes
focus on the auction in a single local market. Assuming
that the conflicting model of secondary users in a specific
channel is a complete graph, we first design an optimal auction
based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to
enforce truthfulness and maximization of the social efficiency.
As everyone knows, the winner determining problem with
VCG mechanism is a NP-hard problem. Therefore, we further
propose a sub-optimal auction with a greedy-like winner
determination mechanism and a critical value based payment
rule, which together induce truthful bidding. We will show that
our sub-optimal auction has a polynomial time complexity and
yields a constant approximation factor at most 6 + 4
√
2. The
low time complexity makes this auction much more practical
for large scale spectrum market. We then conduct extensive
simulation studies on the performance of our mechanisms
using real spectrum availability data. Our simulation results
show that the performance of our sub-optimal mechanism is
efficient in social efficiency compared with the optimal VCG
method. The social efficiency achieved by our suboptimal
method is actually more than 70% of the optimal.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section II intro-
duces preliminaries and our design targets. Sections III and
IV propose our algorithm design for optimal and suboptimal
mechanisms. Section V evaluates the performance of our
mechanisms. Section VI reviews related work and Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Heterogeneous Spectrum Auction Model
Consider a spectrum setting where one auctioneer (Primary
User) contributes m distinct channels to n secondary users
located in a geographic region L. The auctioneer holds the
ĂĂ
Fig. 1. The licensed region L is partitioned into several disjoint sub-regions.
usage right of m spectrums S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} and is willing
to sublease the usage of these channels to secondary users for
time intervals. The auction system consists of n secondary
users B = {b1, b2, ..., bn} who want to pursue the right of
using some channels for some period of time. Based on the
inherent characteristic of spectrum market locality (spatial
heterogeneity), we make the assumption that the entire licensed
region L can be partitioned into several disjoint sub-regions.
Each disjoint geographical sub-region i is denoted by li. Fig.
1 shows a sub-region partition instance. In our model, each
channel is only available in the sub-regions which it can
be used at the same time. Therefore, auctions happened in
different sub-regions do not influence each other.
As we know, spectrum request from secondary user often
specify a particular frequency band they needed in a practical
spectrum market. For example, some wireless users only
request the spectrums residing in lower-frequency bands due
to the limitation of wireless devices. Therefore, we will also
take frequency heterogeneity into consideration in our auction
model. Since that the candidate spectrums can be grouped
into different spectrum type sets ST based on their frequency
bands, we can partition the whole secondary spectrum market
into several local markets. All the spectrums in local market
Mk can be used in the same sub-region and with the same
spectrum type. Since auctions in different local markets have
no mutual effects with each other, we can just focus on the
auction in a single local market Mk.
B. Spectrum Bidding Model
Assume a secondary user bi ∈ B has a set of specific
spectrum requests Ji . Each spectrum request Ij ∈ Ji can
be defined as a job. A secondary user bi can bid for several
distinct jobs in multiple local markets, but only one job at
most in a specific local market. Each Ij ∈ Ji can be described
as Ij = (lj , STj, vj , aj , dj , tj), where lj shows the preferred
spectrum release region, STj explains the interested spectrum
type, and vj denotes the bidding price for the usage right of
specific channel. aj , dj and tj respectively denote each job’s
arrival time, deadline and duration (or job length). Note that
the allocation time slots for each job can only stem from a
single spectrum, and the request time interval is not necessarily
continuous.
Each candidate channel si ∈ S provided by the primary
user can be characterized by a triple (li, STi, Ai), where li
denotes the sub-region where si accommodates, STi describes
3the spectrum type of si , and Ai includes all the available time
slots in si. Primary users will set ηs as the per-unit reservation
price of each spectrum.
C. Economic Requirements and Design Target
In this paper, we will study the complete conflict graph
model for secondary users in each si, and leave the general
conflict graph model as a future work. The objective of
this work is to design a heterogeneous spectrum auction
mechanism satisfying the necessary economic property of
truthfulness (a.k.a Strategyproofness), which maximizes the
social efficiency at the same time.
We use f to denote the vector of all bids in an auction, and
use f−j to denote the set of bids for all jobs except job Ij .
Each job j is charged a payment pj if Ij wins in the auction.
Thus, the utility for job Ij can be stated as:
uj =
{
vj − pj if Ij wins in the auction
0 otherwise (1)
An auction is deemed as truthful if revealing the true
valuation is the dominant strategy for each job bj , regardless
of other jobs’ bids. More formally, an auction is truthful or
strategy-proof, if for any job Ij , and for all fj 6= vj the
following inequality always holds:
uj(vj , f−j) ≥ uj(fj , f−j) (2)
In other words, that an auction is truthful implies that
no player can improve its own profit (utility) by bidding
untruthfully. In our problem, truthfulness requires that:
1) The secondary users report their true valuations for the
usage of spectrum channels (called value-SP).
2) The secondary users report their true required time dura-
tions (called time-SP).
It has been proved in [17], a bid monotonic auction is
truthful and individually rational if it always charges critical
values from secondary users. The monotone allocation implies
there is a critical value for each job such that if Ij bids higher
than critical value then it wins and if Ij bids lower than critical
value then Ij loses.
In this paper, we target at designing a heterogeneous spec-
trum auction which guarantees to achieve maximization of so-
cial efficiency under truthfulness constraint. Social efficiency
is introduced to evaluate the performance of the proposed
mechanism. The social efficiency for an auction mechanism
M is defined as total true valuations of all winners, i.e.
EFF(M) =∑Ij∈I vjyj , where vj denotes the true valuation
of job Ij and yj indicates whether the required channel is al-
located to Ij . Hence, we concerned the following optimization
problem:
max
∑
Ij∈I
vjyj ;
s.t. Economic Robust Constraints
(3)
III. VCG-BASED OPTIMAL AUCTION MECHANISM
DESIGN
In this section, we present an optimal auction which maxi-
mizes the expected social efficiency while enforcing truthful-
ness.
A. VCG-based Optimal Auction Model
Recalling our assumptions in the spectrum auction model
section, auctions in different local markets have no mutual
effects with each other, thus we just focus on the auction in a
single local market Mk in this section. Let I = {I1, ..., IN}
denote the job set in local market Mk, and S = {s1, ..., sM}
be the available spectrum (channel) set in Mk. Our aim is to
achieve the maximization of the social efficiency through an
optimal matching between sets I and S.
Assume Ai = {x1,i, ..., xq,i} includes all the available time
slots in si. Each Ij ∈ I can only be allocated in the time slot
of si between aj and dj . In order to simplify the matching
model between Ij and si, we will make a further segmentation
to Ai based on the arrival time and deadline of all the jobs
in I. For each Ij ∈ I, its arrival time/deadline divides one
of the time slot in si into 2 time slots. As shown in Fig. 2,
the time axis of si is divided into many disjoint time slots
after our segmentation. Let xl,i be the l-th time slot in si and
∆l,i be the length of xl,i. We define ∆l,i = 0 when time
slot xl,i is occupied by the primary user. Assume that the
time slot beginning at aj is the ni,js -th time slot in si and the
time slot ending at dj is the ni,je -th time slot in si. Formally,
yi,j ∈ {0, 1} is a binary variable indicating whether Ij is
allocated in si. We can formulate the spectrum assignment
problem for jobs into an IP (Integral Programming):
maxO(v) =
∑
Ij∈I
∑
si∈S
vjyi,j (4)
subject to 

yi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i,∀j∑
si∈S
yi,j ≤ 1,∀j
vj ≥ ηstj ,∀j
x
j
l,i ≥ 0,∀l,∀i, ∀j∑ni,je
l=n
i,j
s
x
j
l,i ≥ tjyi,j , ∀i,∀j∑
Ij∈I
x
j
l,i ≤ ∆l,i,∀i,∀l
where xjl,i is the time xl,i allocated to Ij , O(v) denotes the
objective function of the IP.
B. VCG-based Optimal Auction Design
We first introduce a VCG-based optimal auction, which
solves the objective function of IP (4) optimally. The winner
determination is to maximize the social efficiency and the
payment for each job is the opportunity cost that its presence
introduces to all the other jobs. The detailed auction process
is given in Algorithm 1.
Solving the above IP optimally is an NP-hard problem,
and its computational complexity is prohibitive for large scale
spectrum market. Therefore, the VCG-based optimal auction
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Fig. 2. An instance of the spectrum si’s time axis segmentation. Let shadow
slots denote the time intervals occupied by primary user, and the blank slots
indicate the intervals which can be allocated to secondary users.
Algorithm 1 VCG-based Optimal Auction Mechanism
1: Let X∗ = (x1, x2, ..., xN ) be the winner determining
vector, where xj = 1 means job Ij wins in the auction,
while xj = 0 indicates no allocation for Ij ;
2: Let P∗ = (p1, p2, ..., pN), where pj is the money that Ij
intends to pay the primary user;
3: Use VCG-based mechanism to get X∗ and P∗;
1) VCG-based mechanism includes an allocation to
maximize the social efficiency.
max
X∗
∑
Ij∈I
∑
si∈S
vjyi,j
s.t. Allocation Constraints.
2) Payment charges each job described as following:
p∗j = maxX∗
−j
∑
k 6=j
∑
si∈S
vkyi,k −max
X∗
∑
k 6=j
∑
si∈S
vkyi,k
pj = max(p
∗
j , ηstj)
4: The final allocation X is set to X∗ and the payment pj is
set to p∗j for each winner and pj = 0 for each loser.
mechanism is only suitable for a relative small-scale spectrum
trading market. In Section IV, we will further design an
auction that is truthful, but computes only an approximately
optimal solution to maximize the social efficiency.
C. Theoretical Analysis
As mentioned before, economic robust constraint should be
satisfied in auction design. We now analyze the properties
of the optimal auction in terms of value-SP and time-SP.
Recall that a bid monotonic auction is value-SP if it always
charges critical values from secondary users. In our VCG-
based optimal auction, the payment for each job Ij is decided
by a fixed X∗−j or its requiring time. So we can say that pj is
independent of vj , which means it is a critical value. There-
fore, the requirement of critical value is satisfied immediately.
Lemma 1: If Ij wins, its payment pj is a critical value.
Lemma 2: The VCG-based optimal auction is bid mono-
tone. That is, for each Ij ∈ I, if Ij wins by bidding price fj ,
ja jd
jI
,l i' 1,l i'
,l ix 1,l ix 
Fig. 3. An instance of the spectrum market in which exists only one spectrum
si and a single job Ij .
then it also wins by bidding any price f ′j ≥ fj .
Proof: Suppose O∗(v) is the optimal solution of objective
function (4) and X∗ is the winner determining vector corre-
sponding to O∗(v) when Ij bids fj . If Ij wins in the auction,
bidding higher can only increase the value of O∗(v). Hence,
O∗(v) is also the optimal solution for objective function (4),
Ij always wins if it bids f ′j ≥ fj , the Lemma holds.
According to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it follows that:
Theorem 3: The VCG-based optimal auction is value-SP
for secondary users.
Since the time-domain is introduced into spectrum auction
mechanism design, time-SP issue should also be considered
at the same time. Now, we will show that the proposed VCG-
based optimal auction is time-SP for each secondary user.
Theorem 4: The VCG-based optimal auction is time-SP for
secondary users.
Proof: We assume each job Ij ∈ I could only claim
a longer job length tj than its actual requirement. Since the
bidding price is the same, if Ij wins by bidding t′j ≥ tj , it
always wins by bidding truthfully. The payment of Ij is time-
independent or increases with tj , so the utility of Ij will not
increase after it lies. However, Ij may lose by bidding t′j ≥ tj ,
while wins by bidding truthfully. In this case, the utility of Ij
will decrease after it lies. This finished the proof.
Based on Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, we have proved
that the designed VCG-based optimal auction is truthful for
secondary users.
Since that our allocation model is discrete, in what follows,
we would like to investigate whether our solution can be simu-
lated by any continuous model. Let the optimal performances
under discrete and continuous allocation models be denoted
as P1 and P2 respectively. In fact, we have the following
conclusion:
Theorem 5: P1P2 →∞.
Proof: Assume there exists only one spectrum (channel)
si and a single job Ij in the scenario. Consider the case as
shown in Fig. 3, if ∆l,i,∆l+1,i < tj , ∆l,i + ∆l+1,i ≥ tj , Ij
cannot be allocated in si with continuous time slots. Therefore,
P2 = 0 holds. However, Ij can be accepted in the discrete
allocation model, thus we get P1 = vj . So P1P2 →∞, and the
theorem holds.
IV. SUBOPTIMAL AUCTION MECHANISM DESIGN
In practice, achieving the social efficiency problem opti-
mally is infeasible in large scale spectrum market. Therefore,
we present a more computationally efficient Per-Value Greedy
(PVG) auction mechanism in this section. The PVG auction
5first allocates the jobs for approximately maximizing social
efficiency with a greedy allocation mechanism, and then
charges the critical value of jobs to ensure truthfulness.
A. Spectrum Allocation Mechanism
We now outline the greedy allocation mechanism. Recall
that vj is the weight (bid) of job Ij and tj is the job
length of Ij . The per-unit weight (bid) of job Ij can be
calculated through ηj = vjtj . All feasible jobs in I are sorted in
descending order according to ηj . The Algorithm 2 maintains
a set A of currently accepted jobs. There are three possible
cases that job Ij can be accepted by Algorithm 2.
Case 1: When a new job Ij is considered according to the
sorted order, we scan all the available spectrums one by one,
Ij is immediately accepted if it can be allocated in one of
these spectrums without time overlapping with any other jobs
in A.
Case 2: If Ij overlaps with some jobs in A, it can also be
accepted when its weight is larger than β(β ≥ 1) times the
sum of weights of all overlapping jobs. In this case, we add
Ij in A and delete all the overlapping jobs in A, and say that
Ij “preempts” these overlapping jobs.
Case 3: After some other jobs accepted in Case 2, job
Ij which has been rejected or preempted before can be
reconsidered for acceptance if it can be allocated without
overlapping with any other jobs.
Define Jk as the job with the k-th smallest ηk which is
allocated in the time slots of si between aj and dj . We say that
jobs J1, ..., Jh overlap with Ij , if Ij can be allocated without
time overlap by deleting jobs J1, ..., Jh in A, but cannot be
allocated by deleting jobs J1, ..., Jh−1 in A.
If Ij’s weight is no larger than β(β ≥ 1) times the sum
of weights of all overlapping jobs J1, ..., Jh, we say that jobs
J1, ..., Jh directly “reject” Ij .
A job Ij “caused” the rejection or preemption of another
job J , if either job Ij directly rejects or preempts job J , or
preempts J indirectly. For example, if job I is preempted by
job J and job J is preempted by Ij , we say that Ij preempts
I indirectly.
If Ij is accepted, we allocate time slots for job Ij starting
from its arrival time and searching for a series of available
time slots in a backward manner. The approximation factor
of our allocation mechanism is stated in the following.
Theorem 6: The approximation factor of the PVG is 6 +
4
√
2.
Proof: Let O be the set of jobs chosen by the optimal
mechanism OPT . Let the set of jobs accepted by Algorithm
2 be denoted by A. For each job I ∈ A, we define a set R(I)
of all the jobs in O that “accounted for” by I . R(I) consists
of I if I ∈ O, and all the jobs in O which are rejected or
preempted by I . More formally:
1) Assume I is accepted by case 1 or 3, then R(I) = {I}
in the case of I ∈ O, and R(I) = ∅ otherwise.
2) Assume I is accepted by case 2, then R(I) is initialized
to contain all those jobs from O that were preempted
Algorithm 2 Spectrum Allocation Algorithm
Input:
I = {I1, ..., IN} // I: the set of all the jobs in Mk sorted
in descending order according to ηj ;
S = {s1, ..., sM} // S: the set of available spectrum in
Mk;
Output:
The set of accepted jobs in A;
1: A = ∅;
2: for j = 1 to N do
3: if vj ≥ ηstj then
4: for i = 1 to M do
5: if Ij can be allocated in si that not overlap with
other jobs then
6: A := A ∪ {Ij};
7: accept Ij and allocate it in si;
8: Break
9: if Ij /∈ A then
10: for i= 1 to M do
11: if the total weight of jobs {J1, ..., Jn} that
overlap with Ij is smaller than w/β then
12: A := A ∪ {Ij}/{J1, ..., Jn};
13: preempt {J1, ..., Jn} and allocate Ij in si;
14: for k = 1 to j do
15: if Ik /∈ A, vk ≥ ηstk and can be allocated
in si that not overlap with other jobs then
16: A := A ∪ {Ik};
17: accept Ik and allocate it in si;
18: Break
19: if Ij /∈ A then
20: reject Ij ;
21: return A;
(directly or indirectly) by I . In addition, R(I) contains I
in the case of I ∈ O.
3) Assume J ∈ O is rejected by line 20 in Algorithm 2 and
let I1, ..., Ih be the jobs in A that overlapped with J at
the time of rejection. We can only allocate each job in the
same spectrum in our model. Hence, I1, ..., Ih and J are
allocated in the same spectrum. Let v denote the weight
of J and let vj denote the weight of Ij for 1 ≤ j ≤ h. We
view J as h imaginary jobs J1, ..., Jh, where the weight
of Ji is vjv∑h
j=1 vj
for 1 ≤ j ≤ h. R(Ij) := R(Ij) ∪ {Jj}.
Note that the weight of Jj is no larger than β times the
weight of Ij according to the rejection rule.
For each job J ∈ O, if J ∈ A, it had been included in R(J)
through our acceptance rule; otherwise, it must be preempted
or rejected by some I ∈ A. In this case, J belongs exactly to
the sets R(I) that preempted or rejected by I . Thus, the union
of all sets R(I) for I ∈ A covers O.
We now fix a job I ∈ A. Let v be the weight of I and let
V be the sum of weights of all jobs in R(I). Then, we can
get that V = v′ + v′′ + v if I ∈ O, where v′ denotes the
weights of all jobs preempted by I , v′′ is the weights of all
6jobs or portion of them rejected by I; otherwise, V = v′+v′′.
Therefore, we can conclude that V ≤ v′ + v′′ + v. Define
ρ = V/v. Our goal is to give the upper bound of ρ.
We first consider the jobs that have been rejected by I .
According to line 20, if J ∈ O overlaps with jobs I1, ..., Ih,
we split J into h imaginary jobs J1, ..., Jh, and let each
overlapping job Ij account for an imaginary job Jj . Therefore,
we can assume that each Jj is only to be rejected by Ij . On
the other hand, if we remove I from A, all of the jobs or
imaginary jobs rejected by I can be accepted by A.
Let J1, ..., Jq be the jobs in O which were rejected by I .
If there exists a job Jk (1 ≤ k ≤ q) which can partition
J1, ..., Jq into two disjoint sections in time-axis, we will define
the arrival point of Jk a critical point; otherwise, we will
choose the arrival time of job I as the critical point. The whole
time-axis will be classified into LOS (Left of Separatrix) and
ROS (Right of Separatrix) by using the critical point as the
separatrix. We define the job whose arrival time later than
critical point belongs to ROS; otherwise, the job belongs to
LOS.
Assume that the job length of I is t, the allocated time in
LOS and ROS last t′ and t′′ respectively. We can easily get
that:
t = t′ + t′′ (5)
Assume that there exists two jobs J1 and J2 located at ROS
in Fig. 4, and a1 is the critical point. Since we allocate time
slots for job J starting from its arrival time and searching
for continuous available time slots in a backward manner, J2
rejected by I indicates that all the available time from a2 to
d2 is less than its job length when d1 ≤ d2 . However, J1
and J2 can be accepted while removing I from A , hence
the job length of J1 is equal to the time overlapped with the
jobs allocated between a1 and d. Assume that the overlap time
Jk with job I is t′k. If all the jobs account for the weight of
time overlap with J1 , we can cover the total weight of J1.
Therefore, the weight of I should account for J1 is equal to
η1t
′
1. It’s obvious that t′1 < t′′, thus we can calculate the total
weight of all the jobs I should account for in ROS:
VROS ≤ v2 + η1t′1 ≤ v2 + η1t′′ (6)
When d1 > d2 , we demonstrate that VROS ≤ v1 + η2t′2 ≤
v1 + η2t
′′ similarly.
Assuming there are more than two jobs in A located in
ROS which were rejected by I , we can easily conclude that
VROS ≤ vi +
∑
k 6=i ηkt
′
k, and
∑
k 6=i t
′
k ≤ t′′.
According to the rejection rule, we can get:
vi ≤ βv (7)
Since the ηk from any of the rejected job Jk is less than the
value of η from I , the following holds:
∑
k 6=i
ηkt
′
k ≤
∑
k 6=i
ηt
′
k ≤ ηt′′ (8)
a d 1d1a 2a 2d
ROSLOS
Fig. 4. The whole time-axis is classified into LOS (Left of Separatrix) and
ROS (Right of Separatrix) by using the critical point as the separatrix. Arrival
time a1 of the job J1 is the critical point in this instance. Shadow parts
indicate the time slots preempted by I .
Based on (7) and (8), the sum of weights VROS of all the
rejected jobs in ROS satisfies:
VROS ≤ βv + t′′η (9)
By the same method, we can easily find sum of weights
VLOS of all the rejected jobs in LOS satisfies:
VLOS ≤ βv + t′η (10)
Combining the above two conditions, sum of weights of all
jobs can be calculated:
v
′′ = VROS + VLOS ≤ 2βv + (t′ + t′′)η = 2βv + v (11)
We now assume inductively that the ρ bound is valid for jobs
with a larger per-unit weight than that of I . Since the overall
weight of the jobs that directly preempted by I is at most v/β,
we can get v/β ∗ ρ ≥ v′. Recall that V ≤ v′ + v′′ + v and
v′′ ≤ 2βv+v hold. We can obtain that V ≤ vρ/β+2βv+v+v.
This implies that V/v = ρ ≤ ρ/β + 2β + 2. The inequality
can be depicted as ρ ≤ 2(β+1)1−1/β equivalently. This inequality
takes its minimal value when β = 1+
√
2, which implies that
ρ ≤ 6 + 4√2. Finally, since the ρ bound holds for all the
jobs in A and the union of all R(I) sets covers all the jobs
taken by OPT , we can conclude that the EFF (OPT ) is at
most ρ times the social efficiency EFF (A). Therefore, the
approximation factor is 6 + 4
√
2.
B. Payment Calculation
After getting the set of accepted jobs by Algorithm 2, we
will calculate the payment for each winner. An auction is
value-SP if and only if it is bid monotone and always charges
the winners its critical value. Therefore, we use the binary
search to find the critical value for each job in A.
Let pj denote the payment of job Ij , and p′j denote the
critical value of Ij ∈ A calculated through binary search.
Since the payment for winner Ij should be no less than ηstj ,
p′j satisfies:
ηstj ≤ p′j ≤ vj (12)
We charge pj = p′j for each winner and pj = 0 for each
loser. According to the payment rule, we can easily get that:
Lemma 7: If Ij wins, its payment pj is a critical value in
the PVG auction.
7C. Theoretical Analysis of the PVG Auction
Similar to the analysis of the VCG-based optimal auction,
we first prove the most important economic property strate-
gyproofness of the PVG auction which requires both value-SP
and time-SP.
To prove the value-SP of the PVG auction, we should first
prove that the allocation resulting from the PVG auction is bid
monotone.
Lemma 8: The allocation resulting from the PVG auction
is bid monotone.
Proof: Supposing job I wins by bidding f in the PVG
auction, we increase I’s bid from f to f ′ with f ′ > f . Assume
j is the rank of I by bidding f in I, and i is the new rank
of I by bidding f ′. Then we can get that η = ft ≤ f
′
t = η
′
,
i ≤ j.
Suppose I loses in the auction by bidding f ′, there are two
possible cases:
Case 1: The job I is accepted through line 6, but preempted
by job J , This means I overlaps with J . According to our
preemption rule, J also can be accepted when I bids truthfully.
There is no enough time available for I after J is accepted.
Thus, I cannot be accepted by bidding f either. If J is also be
preempted by another job, and if I is still not be accepted by
bidding f ′ according to line 17, then it will not be accepted
by bidding f either.
Case 2: I has never been accepted. This means I overlaps
with one or more jobs which have been accepted in A. In this
case, I cannot be accepted by bidding f either.
According to the above analysis, if I wins by bidding f in
the PVG auction, it always wins by bidding f ′ > f . Therefore,
the allocation resulting from the PVG auction is bid monotone.
The lemma holds.
We will give the truthful demonstration of the proposed
PVG auction mechanism through Theorem 9 and Theorem
10. With Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, we obtain:
Theorem 9: The PVG auction is value-SP.
Then we show that the PVG auction scheme is time-SP for
secondary users.
Theorem 10: The PVG auction is time-SP.
Proof: We also assume the job Ij ∈ I can only claim a
longer job length t′j than its actual requirement in the PVG
auction. If Ij wins by bidding a fake job length t′j > tj , we
can get that:
ηj =
fj
tj
≤ fj
t′j
= η′j (13)
Similar to the proof of Lemma 8, we can easily obtain that
Ij also wins by bidding tj . Since the payment of Ij is time-
independent or increased with tj , since the utility of Ij will
not be increased when it lies. However, Ij may lose by bidding
t′j > tj , while winning by bidding truthfully. In this case, the
utility of Ij will be decreased after it lies.
So Theorem holds.
Based on Theorem 9 and Theorem 10, we have proved that
the PVG auction is also truthful for secondary user.
At last, we discuss the time complexity of the PVG auction.
Assume ξ denotes the minimum bid size, and Vmax =
max
Ij∈A
(vj − ηstj). Therefore, we have:
Theorem 11: The time complexity of the PVG auction is
O(MN2logP ), where M is the number of channels, N is the
number of jobs, and P = Vmax/ξ.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we conduct extensive simulations to examine
the performance of the proposed auctions.
A. Simulation Setup
In order to make the experimental results more convinc-
ing and close to reality, we adopt the data set based on
analysis of measurement data, which is collected in Guang-
dong Province, China. We choose the frequency band of
Broadcasting TV1(48.5 - 92MHz) for comparison from many
frequency band of services, and intercept continuous 5 days’
record from the whole measurement data. Total bandwidth of
TV1 is split into plenty of channels in accordance with the
width of 0.2MHz. For each channel, the data are divided into
massive time slots, and we roughly set each time slot about
75 seconds. As a result, total number of time slots reaches to
5760 (5days/75s).
Fig. 5 shows a depiction of the channel vacancy located in
frequency band of TV1. We use black color to represent the
occupied time slots and white color to denote the white space
for each channel. The comparison figure makes some charac-
teristics of spectrum usage easier to visualize, for instance, we
can easily find that the usage time of primary user is basically
the same in each day. Therefore, the vacancy time slots in all
5 days are selected as the idle slots for auction to ensure the
usage of primary user at the same time.
In our simulations, we select 3 channels from the whole
frequency band of TV1 as input, and the total time of each
channel lasts 24 hours from 0:00 to 24:00. We generate all
the bid values from secondary users with a reservation price
and the requirement of job length for each secondary user is
uniformly distributed in the range of [0.5,2] hours. The request
time interval with arrival time and deadline for each secondary
user is uniformly distributed in the range of [2,4] hours. λ
shows the number of requests in our setting, Here, we generate
two different scenarios.
• Set 1: All the requests are uniformly distributed in 24
hours without hot time.
• Set 2: There exists hot time in this setting, which contains
about δ requests of the whole day. In our simulation
setting, we set δ = 80%.
B. Performance of the Auction Mechanisms
In this section, we study the performance of the PVG mech-
anism compared with the VCG-based optimal mechanism. We
mainly focus on the performance of social efficiency and total
revenue for primary user. For comparison, we plot results
for 2 different request sets mentioned above, and analyze
8Fig. 5. Usage of spectrum for 5 days, an instance of frequency band of
Broadcasting TV1.
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Fig. 6. Social efficiency ratio and spectrum utilization ratio under Set 1 and
2, ηs = 0, β = 2.
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Fig. 7. Expected revenue ratio under different data sets, β = 2.
influences of the relationship between supply and demand
from the results.
Fig. 6(a) illustrates the social efficiency ratio of the PVG
auction and the VCG-based optimal auction. We see that
the PVG auction works as well as the VCG-based optimal
auction when λ is small. This is because there is enough
available time for each secondary user, and most of them can
be allocated without overlapping with others in both schemes.
The competition among secondary users increases with λ,
the VCG-based optimal auction outperforms the PVG auction
gradually. The social efficiency ratio keeps approximately
stable when λ is large enough, where the supply is much less
than demand. From Figs. 6(a) and 6(b), we can see that the
PVG auction performs best in the lightly loaded system and
worst in highly loaded system of set 2. However, even in the
worst case, the social efficiency ratio of the PVG auction is
still above 70% of the VCG-based optimal auction.
In Fig. 7(a), we plot the relationship between ηs and the
expected revenue ratio for primary user in Set 1, where the
expected revenue ratio is the total payment of all the winning
secondary users compared with the social efficiency when
ηs = 0. When the number of requests is small (8 or 15
in Fig. 7(a)), the competition is weak, some of the requests
from secondary users can be allocated in channels without
overlapping with others. Thus, the payment of these secondary
users is equal to the product of ηs and the request time. In
this case, the total revenue for primary user increases along
with ηs. However, a request cannot be allocated in channels
if its per-unit bid is smaller than ηs. Thus, many secondary
users may lose in the auction due to their bids are smaller
than the product of ηs and their request time. The revenue of
primary user will decreases with the value of ηs when ηs is
set too high. Most of the requests from the wining secondary
users overlap with at least one request from a losing secondary
user, when there are plenty of requests from secondary users
in the spectrum market (λ = 25). The revenue of primary user
will decrease with the value of ηs in this case. This is more
obvious in Set 2. Due to the fierce competition among requests
in hot time, the revenue of primary user doesn’t increase by
setting a higher ηs even when λ = 15. We can make some
reasonable hypothesis based on the analysis of experimental
results from Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b). The primary user can
improve its revenue by setting a suitable ηs under the condition
that supply exceeds demand. The revenue of primary user can
be maximized through the competition of secondary users in
the condition that demand exceeds supply, the revenue will
decrease with a large ηs.
VI. LITERATURE REVIEWS
Auction serves as an efficient way to distribute scarce
resources in a market and it has been extensively studied in
the scope of spectrum allocation in recent years. Many works
follow on the designs of wireless spectrum auctions in different
scenarios. For instance, [7] and [19] study the spectrum band
auctions aiming to minimize the spectrum interference.
Truthfulness is a critical factor to attract participation [15].
Many well-known truthful auction mechanisms are designed to
achieve economical robustness [2], [16], [20]. Unfortunately,
none of the earlier spectrum auctions address the problem
of truthfulness. Truthfulness is first designed for spectrum
auction in [28], where spectrum reuse is considered. Similar
model is adopted by the following works: [29], [24], [21],
[22], [9], [11], [1], [8], [23], [21], etc. Specifically, [11] and
[1] focus on designing truthful mechanisms for maximizing
revenue for the auctioneer; [8] chooses the classic max-
min fairness criterion in the study of the fairness issue in
spectrum allocations to achieve global fairness; [23] supports
spectrum reservation prices in the auction model. TODA [21]
first takes time domain into account, and proposes a truthful
suboptimal auction with polynomial time complexity aiming
to generate maximum revenue for the auctioneer. District
mechanism [22] first takes the spectrum locality into account
and gives an economically robust and computationally efficient
method. Different from traditional periodic auction model,
many works study the spectrum allocation in an online model
[21], [5], [26]. However, most existing works concentrate on
a truthful mechanism design without considering spectrums
as non-identical items. The proposed optimal and sub-optimal
spectrum auction mechanisms take the inherent spectrum
heterogeneous characteristics into consideration in this paper.
9Heterogeneous spectrum transaction issue has been studied
in [6], [18] and [14]. In [6], Feng et al. propose a truthful
double auction method for heterogeneous spectrum allocation.
[18] and [14] solve the heterogeneous auction problems in
different perspectives. However, they do not consider time do-
main issue in their works, thus making the spectrum allocation
incomplete.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied a general truthful secondary spec-
trum auction framework of heterogeneous spectrum allocation.
We designed two auction mechanisms to maximize the social
efficiency. One is optimal design for social efficiency by using
the classic VCG mechanism, but it has high complexity. The
proposed PVG auction scheme has a constant approximation
factor but is computationally much more efficient. These auc-
tions provide primary users sufficient incentive to share their
spectrum and make dynamic spectrum access more practical.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that takes
both the spectrum heterogeneity and a flexible time request
from secondary users into consideration.
Several interesting questions are left for future research. The
first one is to study the case when the request of a secondary
user may be served by several channels in a single local
market. The second one is when a secondary user’s requests
may cover multiple spectrum markets. We need to investigate
the impact of crossing dependence of different markets. The
third challenging question is to design truthful mechanisms
when we have to make online decisions.
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